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I. INTRODUCTION
When a shareholder in a family held corporation' decides to retire,
he generally desires to obtain capital gain treatment on the exchange
of his stock,2 similar to that which a shareholder in a publicly held
* Branko J. Marusic, Jr., Tax Manager with Ernst & Whinney, St. Louis, Missouri;
B.S.B.A., 1980, University of Missouri-Columbia; J.D., 1985, Washington Univer-
sity Law School.
1. A family held corporation refers to a corporation in which members of a family
hold exclusive stock ownership of the corporation.
2. Throughout this Article, the author assumes that the corporation has not annu-
ally distributed its yearly profits to its shareholders. The shareholder attempting
the redemption desires to obtain capital gains treatment on his redemption to the
extent his share of corporate earnings and profit exceeds his stock basis. There
exist instances, though, in which a shareholder might desire a redemption to be
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corporation would receive under similar circumstances. Unlike the
publicly held corporation shareholder, the shareholder in a family
owned corporation would like also to maintain exclusive corporate
ownership within his family. Accordingly, the shareholder cannot sell
his stock to an outsider. In addition, other family members may not
have sufficient funds to purchase his interest. The family shareholder
solves his dilemma by effecting a corporate redemption of his stock. A
qualifying redemption3 provides the shareholder both capital gains
treatment and the continuance of exclusive, family corporate
ownership.
In order to receive capital gains treatment for his redemption, the
shareholder must terminate his interest in the corporation.4 Internal
Revenue Code section 302(c)(2)(A)5 prohibits the shareholder from
retaining any interest in the corporation, including holding the posi-
tion of an officer, director, or employee, but excluding an interest as a
creditor.6 The confusion surrounding the interpretation of this pro-
hibited interest has historically plagued corporate shareholders.
This Article describes the differing interpretations of the prohib-
ited interest of section 302(c)(2)(A). It analyzes the legislative history
of section 302,7 which requires a rigorous and mechanical reading of
the section. The Internal Revenue Service's view, which is generally
consistent with the congressional intent behind section 302, will be
compared with the Tax Court's position. Until recently, the court has
held that a prohibited interest is proved by a showing of a retained
financial or managerial interest.8 The court's current position, set
forth in Seda v. Commissioner9 and Lynch v. Commissioner,O reflects
a stricter reading of section 302(c)(2)(A). The Article concludes with a
criticism of the Tax Court's most recent interpretation of a prohibited
interest, which, although an advance in the direction evinced by Con-
characterized as a § 301 dividend. A corporate shareholder, for example, might
desire a redemption distribution to be treated as a dividend in order for the corpo-
ration to avail itself of the corporate 85% dividend exclusion.
3. A qualifying redemption must meet the requirements of § 302. See infra notes
12-29 and accompanying text (discussing the mechanics of a § 302 redemption).
4. The family shareholder must terminate his stock ownership pursuant to
§ 302(b)(3) and abstain from the retention of other prohibited corporate interests
as described in § 302(c)(2)(A). See infra notes 12-29 and accompanying text
(describing the interaction of these two sections).
5. All references hereinafter to "section" are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
as amended.
6. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(i). See infra notes 12-29 and accompanying text (analyzing
the mechanics of the section).
7. See infra notes 30-51 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 52-218 and accompanying text.
9. 82 T.C. 484 (1984).
10. 83 T.C. 597 (1984).
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gress, nevertheless falls short of the statute's intended meaning.l
II. THE MECHANICS OF SECTION 302(c)(2)(A)
Section 302(a) 12 treats a corporate redemption13 of a shareholder's
stock as an exchange subject to capital gains treatment,14 provided the
redemption meets the requirements of section 302(b).' 5 A redemption
not qualifying as an exchange receives ordinary dividend treatment.' 6
Accordingly, a redemption treated as an exchange results in tax treat-
ment similar to that of a sale of stock to a third party.
The third-party sale analogy ends when a corporation redeems a
shareholder's interest in a family owned corporation. The ex-share-
holder, for example, might maintain a direct or indirect beneficial in-
terest in the corporate business through the stockholdings of his
relatives.17 If so, the redemption of his shares reduces only the form
of his interest in the corporation. To prevent a redemption coupled
with a continuing interest from receiving capital gains treatment, the
Code provides that a redeeming shareholder constructively owns, at
the moment of the redemption, the remaining corporate stock held by
certain members of his family.' 8  Thus, absent the Section
11. See infra notes 164-218 and accompanying text.
12. I.R.C. § 302(a).
13. Section 317(b) defines a redemption of stock as the acquiring by the corporation
of "its stock from a shareholder in exchange for property, whether or not the
stock so acquired is cancelled, retired, or held as treasury stock." I.R.C. § 317(b).
14. Section 302(a) treats a qualifying redemption as an exchange of stock. The Code
treats an exchange of stock as the sale or exchange of a capital asset. I.R.C.
§§ 1221, 1222.
15. I.R.C. § 302(a). The specified requirements include: (1) redemptions not essen-
tially equivalent to dividends; (2) substantially disproportionate redemption of
stock; (3) termination of a shareholder's interest; and (4) redemption from
noncorporate shareholders in partial liquidation. I.R.C. § 302(b).
16. I.R.C. § 302(d).
17. The redeeming shareholder in a family owned corporation argues for capital gain
treatment similar to that which he would have received had he sold his interest to
a third-party. A stock redemption, however, prevents the outside interference
that would have resulted had the shareholder sold his stock outside of his family.
Bittker, Stock Redemptions and Partial Liquidations Under the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954, 9 STAN. L. REV. 13, 33 (1956).
18. I.R.C. § 302(c)(1). The Code provides that the attribution rules of § 318(a) shall
apply. Id. Section 318 generally states that an individual constructively owns the
stock held by certain members of his family, by partnerships and estates or trusts
of which he is a partner or beneficiary, and in the amount of his proportionate
ownership, and by corporations of which he is at least a 50% shareholder. I.R.C.
§ 318(a). The members of the individual's family, whose stock the individual is
deemed to constructively own, include his spouse (unless legally separated or di-
vorced), children, grandchildren, and parents. Stock held by the individual's sib-
lings or grandparents is not attributed to him by § 318(a). The attribution rules of
§ 318, which provide an objective means of determining stock ownership, rely on
the rationale that related individuals and entities will act in concert and for the
[Vol. 65:486
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302(c)(2)(A) provisions, a redeeming shareholder in a family owned
corporation would never obtain a recognized reduction of his corpo-
rate interest under the requirements of section 302(b).19
Section 302(c)(2)(A) provides a shareholder effecting a redemption
relief from the family attribution rules. A shareholder terminating
his stock interest in the corporation pursuant to section 302(b)(3)20
benefit of each other. Benjamin v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 1084, 1107 (1976), cff'd,
592 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1979). The attribution rules prevent taxpayers from gain-
ing from redemptions that transfer legal title to their stock but do not affect the
true control or benefit that they exercise and enjoy through the remaining re-
lated shareholders. For example, a sole shareholder could transfer some shares
to his daughter, redeem his remaining interest, and remain in control of the cor-
poration as president by exercising influence over his daughter. In substance, no
beneficial interests in the corporation have changed. Yet, without the family at-
tribution rules, the father would obtain capital gain treatment for the full termi-
nation of his stock holdings under § 302(b)(3). Section 318(a)(1)(A) states that
the father constructively owns the stock of his daughter which results in his own-
ing 100% of the corporation's stock after the redemption. Consequently, his per-
centage of corporation ownership remains the same and his redemption does not
receive capital gains treatment.
Although § 318(a) provides an objective test for determining stock ownership
at the time of the redemption, the courts have recognized that under certain cir-
cumstances, hostile family relationships will mitigate or prevent family stock at-
tribution under § 318(a)(1). Robin Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43,46-48
(1st Cir. 1975). The service will not follow the Haft hostility exception. Rev. Rul.
80-26, 1980-1 C.B. 66. Furthermore, the Tax Court will recognize the Haft family
hostility exception when it reviews only § 302(b)(1) "essentially equivalent to a
dividend" redemptions. See Metzger Trust v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 42 (1981); see
also Niedemeyer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 280 (1975) (bad blood between relatives
does not affect § 318(a)(1) attribution), aff'd per curiam, 535 F.2d 500 (9th Cir.),
cert denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976). For a "legal"-family hostility twist, see Blount
v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 1023, aff'd, 425 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1969), which provides an
analysis of the application of § 318(a)(1) rules to an installment redemption when
husband and wife shareholders are married during the initial but not during the
latter installments.
Trusts, estates, partnerships, and corporations may not waive attribution be-
tween their beneficiaries, partners, or shareholders. These entities may, how-
ever, generally waive the family attribution of stock to their beneficiaries to
prevent a second attribution of the family owned stock to the entity.
§ 302(c)(2)(C).
19. See infra notes 30-51 and accompanying text.
20. A § 302(b)(3) redemption requires a complete termination of the shareholder's
corporate stock interest. The courts have stated that § 302(b)(3) requires that a
shareholder divest himself of all his equitable holdings in the corporation. Com-
missioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965); Bryant v. Commissioner, 399 F.2d 800
(5th Cir. 1968). See also Rev. Rul. 76-524, 1976-2 C.B. 94 (stating that a stock-
holder may remain an officer or a director after a redemption if he has no actual
or constructive stock ownership afterwards). Accordingly, the requirements of
§ 302(b)(3) require a complete stock holding divesture and no "de minimis" ex-
ceptions to the rule are permitted. Niedemeyer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 280, 290
(1975).
An equitable or proprietary interest could also include corporate indebtedness
to the ex-shareholder. Thus, corporate obligations to ex-shareholders, including
1986]
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and complying with section 302(c)(2)(A) will not constructively own,
for purposes of the redemption, the remaining corporate stock held by
his family.2 1 Section 302(c)(2)(A) requires that "immediately after
the distribution the distributee [have] no interest in the corporation
(including an interest as officer, director, or employee), other than an
interest as creditor."22 In addition, the section requires that "the dis-
tributee ... not acquire any such interest (other than stock acquired
by bequest or inheritance) within 10 years from the date of such distri-
bution,"23 and that the distributee file an agreement with the Service
stating that he will not obtain any such interest.24
The Code denies the above relief from the family attribution rules
to a distributee (shareholder effecting the redemption) who acquires
his redeemed stock from a related person 25 within ten years preceding
the redemption and for the principal purpose of tax avoidance.26 In
addition, if a related party to the distributee holds stock at the date of
redemption which he acquired from the distributee within ten years
preceding the redemption, the relief is likewise denied.27 Neither of
the above reinstatements of the family attribution rules will apply
when the acquisition (or disposition) of the stock by the distributee
does not have as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of tax.28
The "as one of its principal purposes" statutory language implies that
a transaction may contain more than one principal purpose, therefore,
"principal purpose" does not connote a predominant purpose. Gener-
ally, acquisitions or dispositions of stock for business purposes are not
considered principally tax avoidance purposes. 29
indebtedness resulting from a redemption payment, must run the gamut of § 385
debt-versus-equity scrutiny. For an in-depth analysis of the debt versus equity
problem in § 302(b)(3) redemptions, see Comment, Complete Stock Redemption
in a Family Corporation: A Warning About the Pitfalls of Two Standards, 23
VILL. L. REV. 100 (1978). See generally B. BrrrEa & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL IN-
COME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 4.01-4.22, at 4-2 to 4-58
(4th ed. 1979).
21. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A). Note that the section blocks only the family attribution
rules of § 318(a)(1). See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
22. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(i).
23. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(ii). An ex-shareholder who utilizes § 302(b)(3) does not ac-
quire a prohibited interest when a § 318(a) related party acquires stock in the
corporation within 10 years of redemption. Rev. Rul. 71-562, 1971-2 C.B. 173.
24. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(iii).
25. "Related person" refers to a § 318(a)(1) family member.
26. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(B)(i).
27. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(B)(ii).
28. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(B).
29. In Rev. Rul. 56-584, 1956-2 C.B. 179, the controlling shareholder of a family-
owned corporation gave a small interest in the corporation to his son. The father
hoped that the gift would increase the son's desire to participate in the corpora-
tion. Several years after the gift, the son left the corporation and redeemed all of
his shares pursuant to §§ 302(b)(3) and 302(c)(2)(A).
The ruling holds that the redemption qualifies as an exchange under § 302(a)
[Vol. 65:486
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III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Prior to the 1954 Code, the law of corporate stock redemptions was
marked by uncertainty.3 0 Section 115(g) of the 1939 Code stated that a
redemption "essentially equivalent to a dividend" would not receive
capital gains treatment.3 1 The related regulations utilized a "facts and
circumstances" approach to determine if the redemption fell within
the essentially equivalent standard.3 2 Although the regulations pro-
vided little insight into this standard,33 they were clear on the point
that a corporate redemption of all the stock of a particular share-
holder, resulting in the cessation of any interest in corporate affairs,
would not result in a distribution essentially equivalent to a divi-
dend.34 Notwithstanding this full termination of stock interest test,
because the gift to promote an interest in the corporation suffices as a bona fide
business purpose and there was no plan in existence at the time of the gift to
effect a redemption of the stock. The gift of stock, therefore, did not have tax
avoidance as one of its principal purposes. 1d. at 180. See also H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. A76 (1954), reprinted in 1 B. REAMS, JR., INTERNAL REvENuE
ACTS OF THE UNrrED STATES: THE REvENuE ACT OF 1954 wrrH LEGis. HsToREs
AND CONG. DOCUMENTS A76 (1982) [hereinafter cited as REAMS] (providing that a
taxpayer will meet the terms of § 302(c)(3)(C) when his transaction has both a
bona fide business purpose and the absence of a principal purpose of tax
avoidance).
30. In 1954, the Senate Committee on Finance described the ambiguities surrounding
redemptions. "Under present law it is not clear when a stock redemption results
in capital gain or ordinary income. Some courts have held a distribution dispro-
portionate to the shareholders' ownership of common stock in the corporation
results in capital gains treatment, but no definite test has developed." S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1954), reprinted in 2 REAMS, supra note 29, at 44. See
also B. BrITKER & J. EUsTIcE, supra note 20, 9.02, at 9-4 to 9-7; Murphy, Divi-
dend Equivalency--The End of the Beginning?, 10 TAx L. REV. 213,213-14 (1955).
31. Section 115(c) of the 1939 Code treats amounts distributed in partial liquidation as
payments in exchange for stock of the distributing corporation. Amounts distrib-
uted in partial liquidation included distributions in cancellation or redemption by
a corporation of part of its stock I.R.C. § 115(c) (1939). Section 115(g) modified
the application of § 115(c). "If a corporation cancels or redeems its stock ... at
such time and in such manner as to make the distribution and cancellation or
redemption in whole or in part essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxa-
ble dividend, the amount so distributed... shall be treated as a taxable divi-
dend." I.R.C. § 115(g) (1939). See Bittker, supra note 17, at 14-15 (describing the
chronological development of the statutory language "essentially equivalent to a
dividend").
32. The regulations provided, in relevant part: 'The question whether a distribution
in connection with a cancellation or redemption of stock is essentially equivalent
to the distribution of a taxable dividend depends upon the circumstances of each
case." Reg. 118, § 39.115(g)-1(A)(2) (1940).
33. The regulations did state that a partial corporate redemption of stock pro rata
among all the shareholders will generally be considered as effecting a distribu-
tion essentially equivalent to a dividend. Id
34. Id. Section 302(b)(3) currently reflects the "old" regulations language of a re-
demption of all the shareholder's stock in the corporation. The courts inter-
preted regulation language requiring the shareholder to cease his interest in the
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shareholders attempting redemptions generally faced planning
nightmares. 35
In drafting the 1954 Code, the House Ways and Means Committee
recognized the existent ambiguities in the corporate redemption
area.36 The Committee's initial proposal to revamp the redemption
area discarded the "essentially equivalent to a dividend" test and the
facts and circumstances inquiry that accompanied it.37 In its place, the
Committee attempted to introduce specific conditions that would en-
able taxpayers to enter "safe harbors" when structuring
redemptions.38
Section 302(b)(3) of the House bill codified the full termination of a
shareholder's stock interest test as one of its specific redemption con-
ditions.39 Under section 302(a)(3), the Committee made it clear that a
corporation affairs as a termination of a shareholder's equity interest. See, eg.,
Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954). See also Rose, The Prohibited
Interest of Section 302(c)(2)(A), 36 TAx L. REv. 131, 134 n.18 (1981) (Rose suggests
that the "ceases to be interested" language may have been the Service's safeguard
against nominal transfers of stock in form only. The safeguard permitted the
Service to attribute other family members' stock to the ex-shareholder.). But see
Bittker, supra note 17, at 36 n.81 (suggesting that the language was to prevent the
redemption of shares through payments made exclusively from future corporate
profits).
35. "Existing law with respect to corporate distributions, liquidations, and in-
tercorporation transactions is so uncertain that it has seriously impeded transac-
tions which are desirable both for the companies involved and for the economy."
100 CoNG. REc. 3425 (1954) (statement of Rep. Reed), reprinted in 2 REAMS,
supra note 29, at 3425. See also Bittker, supra note 17, at 16 ("[Tjhere proved to
be no escape from the inquiry into all the facts and circumstances of each case,
and predictions were hazardous .... "). In addition, the taxpayer had the bur-
den of proving that his redemption was not essentially equivalent to a dividend.
Id. at 15.
36. The Committee expressed concern about the "uncertainty of existing law" re-
garding the tax treatment of shareholders in corporate redemptions. H.R. REP.
No. 1337, supra note 29, at A70, reprinted in 1 REAMS supra note 29, at A70.
37. The approach adopted in Section 115 (g) of existing law, whereby
the consequences resulting from the redemption of stock may be taxed
depending upon the factual circumstances surrounding the redemption
have been changed by your committee. In lieu of a factual inquiry in
every case, it is intended to prescribe specific conditions from which the
taxpayer may ascertain whether a given redemption will be taxable at
rates applicable to the sale of assets or as a distribution of property not in
redemptions of stock subject to Section 301.
Id. at A72-A73, reprinted in 1 RsAMS, supra note 29, at A72-A73.
38. "Under [Sections 302(b)](3), (4), and (5), the test of factual equivalence to a divi-
dend distribution is eliminated and definitive standards are enumerated." Id. at
A73. "The bill [H.R. 8300] contains a complete technical overhaul of the [1939
Code section 115(g)] provisions which is designed to promote certainty and to per-
mit legitimate and desirable transactions .... 100 CONG. REc., supra note 35,
at 3425, reprinted in 2 REAMS, supra note 29, at 3425.
39. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 302(b)(3), reprinted in 11 REAMS, supra note 30,
at 86.
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redemption of all of the stock held by a shareholder would qualify for
capital gains treatment. The Committee eliminated the previous fac-
tual equivalence test 40 and opted for an objective stock ownership at-
tribution rule that prevents a shareholder from claiming complete
termination of her stock interest when related parties hold the re-
maining corporate stock.41 Thus, unless the stockholder properly
waived her family-stock attribution, she would not receive capital
gains treatment on her redemption.42
The section 302(c)(2) (A) waiver of family attribution rules, applica-
ble solely upon a complete termination of a stockholder's interest, was
an additional attempt to provide clarity in the redemption area.43
Prior to 1954, it was unclear whether and when the attribution of re-
maining family-held stock should apply to a family corporation re-
demption.44 Proposed section 302(c)(3)(A) permitted a waiver of the
family attribution rules if, immediately after the redemption, the ex-
shareholder retained no interest in the corporation, including any in-
terest as an officer, director, or employee, but excepting an interest as
a creditor.45 The Committee claimed that this section provided a de-
finitive answer to the problem of administering the existing uncer-
40. H.&. REP. No. 1337, supra note 29, at A73, reprinted in 1 REAMS, supra note 29, at
A73.
41. H.F. 8300, supra note 39, § 302(c)(1), reprinted in 11 REAMs, supra note 29, at 86-
87.
42. Id. The structure of §§ 302(c)(1) and 318(a) prevent the evasion of ordinary divi-
dend treatment. Id. at 36; S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 30, at 45, reprinted in 2
REAMs, supra note 29, at 45.
43. See Rose, supra note 34, at 136-38.
44. Prior to the 1954 Code, there were no statutory provisions mandating the con-
structive ownership of stock for distributions in redemption. H.R. REP. No. 1337,
supra note 29, at A96, reprinted in 1 REAMs, supra note 29, at A96. Conse-
quently, the administration of I.R.C. § 115(g) (1939) became "clouded with uncer-
tainty by reason of executive application of rules of attribution of ownership." Id.
Notwithstanding the lack of statutory authority, both the Service and the courts
at times regarded the relationships between a shareholder whose stock was re-
deemed and the remaining shareholders as significant. B. BrrrXE & J. EusTicE,
supra note 20, at 9-11 n.18. See Rose, supra note 34, at 135-36 (analyzing the gov-
ernment's attempts prior to the 1954 Code to assert constructive stock attribution
upon redemptions).
45. H.R. 8300, supra note 39, § 302(c)(2)(A), reprinted in 11 REAMS, supra note 29, at
87. The legislative history of § 302(c)(2)(A) fails to mention a rationale for the
statutory "creditor interest" exception. Without this exception corporations
would need to fund the entire shareholder redemption price as well as additional
existing indebtedness to the shareholder at the time of the redemption. Accord-
ingly, the financial strain put upon a corporation to fund this potentially large
amount at one time would render a majority of redemptions impractical. In addi-
tion, many states outlaw such vast depletions of corporation assets. See, e.g.,
MODEL BusiNEss CORP. AcT § 6 (1974) (redemption distributions may not exceed
unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus). See generally Rose, supra note 34,
at 159-60; Comment, supra note 20, at 104-05.
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tainties under section 115(g) of the 1939 Code.46 It follows, then, that
the final version of section 302(c)(2)(A) reflected the Committee's
general desire to introduce certainty and an easily administered stan-
dard to the redemption area.
The Senate agreed that certainty was needed in the redemption
area but believed the House provisions were too restrictive.47 Rather
than completely revise the pre-1954 redemption law, the Senate opted
for the "essentially equivalent to a dividend" standard as an alterna-
tive test that would qualify a redemption for capital gains treatment.48
Thus, in some instances, taxpayers could assert that they had effected
a redemption based upon the facts and circumstances surrounding
their particular situation.49 This factual inquiry, however, began and
46. H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 29, at A75, reprinted in 1 REAMS, supra note 29, at
A75. The technical explanation of H.R. 8300 provides an example of a prohibited
interest under § 302(c)(2)(A). In the example, a husband and wife each own 50%
of a corporation's stock. The husband fully redeems his shares pursuant to
§ 302(b)(3). The example states that if the husband became an officer of the cor-
poration nine years after receiving the redemption proceeds, he is deemed to have
acquired a prohibited interest. H.R. REP. No. 137, supra note 29, at A75-A76, re-
printed in 1 REAMS, supra note 29, at A75-A76.
47. The Senate Committee on Finance stated: "Under present law it is not clear
when a stock redemption results in capital gain or ordinary income.... While
the House bill set forth definite conditions under which stock may be redeemed
at capital-gain rates, these rules appeared unnecessarily restrictive .... S. REP.
No. 1622, supra note 30, at 44, reprinted in 2 REAMS, supra note 29, at 44.
48. The Senate Finance Committee stated:
Your committee has substantially recast the provisions of the House bill
dealing with the tax treatment of corporate distributions and adjust-
ments .... It shares the belief that this part of the statute must be
rewritten in order to provide a degree of certainty which is lacking in
existing law. However, such certainty is not to be achieved at the ex-
pense of the legislative flexibility necessary to provide a statutory pat-
tern which will tax, in an equitable manner, the myriad business
transactions with which this area of law is concerned. The House bill
... would make it difficult for necessary business transactions to be car-
ried out with a minimum degree of interference from the tax laws.
The House bill in this area is, in substance, an entirely new statute
using few of the terms or concepts with which the courts or the bar have
become familiar over the years. Your committee has sought a less ex-
treme approach. Rather than to replace the existing statute, it has
sought to rewrite it so as to preserve the terms and concepts of existing
law wherever possible. It has, however, not hesitated to depart from the
present statute where such departure was necessary ....
Id at 41-42, reprinted in 2 REAMS, supra note 29, at 41-42. The standard is codi-
fied in § 302(b)(1), which states that a redemption not essentially equivalent to a
dividend will receive capital gains treatment.
49. The Senate Committee on Finance submitted that redemptions of preferred
stock, which might be called by the corporation without a minority shareholder
having any control over date of redemption, would constitute a distribution not
essentially equivalent to a dividend to such shareholder. S. REP. No. 1622, supra
note 30, at 44, reprinted in 2 REAMS, supra note 29, at 44.
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ended with section 302(b)(1)50 since the Senate did not intend to pro-
mote a factual inquiry test for the definitive standards established
under sections 302(b)(3) and 302(c)(2)(A) of the House bill.51
IV. JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATIONS
Both the Tax Court and the Service agree that a shareholder must
completely sever any equitable interest in the corporation under sec-
tion 302(b)(3),52 but disagree as to what constitutes a section
50. The Senate Committee on Finance said.
Unlike the House bill, however, Section 302 does not provide specific
statutory guides governing the tax consequences of every stock redemp-
tion. In lieu of the approach in the House bill, your committee intends to
revert in part to existing law by making the determination of whether a
redemption is taxable as a sale at capital gains rates or as a dividend at
ordinary income rates dependent, except where it is speckfically provided
otherwise, upon a factual inquiry....
... In general, under this subsection your committee intends to in-
corporate into the bill existing law as to whether or not a reduction is
essentially equivalent to a dividend under Section 115(g)(1) of the 1939
Code, and in addition to provide three definite standards in order to
provide certainty in specific instances.
Id. at 233, reprinted in 2 REAms, supra note 29, at 233 (emphasis added). Thus,
the definitive standards intended by the House bill were agreed to and retained
by the Senate.
51. See supra note 50. In addition, the Senate retained the House provision in
§ 302(c)(2)(A) requiring the ex-shareholder to refrain from acquiring or retaining
a prohibited interest after this redemption in order to qualify for a waiver of the
family attribution rules. The Finance Committee said
A distribution in complete redemption of a shareholder's stock will
also result in capital gain. However, in order to prevent tax avoidance,
your committee follows the rules of the House bill whereby, under spe-
cific circumstances, a shareholder may be considered as owning stock
held by members of his family (or by partnerships, corporations, or es-
tates, trusts in which he has an interest). If a shareholder desires to
sever completely his interest in a corporation which he and his family
controls [sic], the rules of family ownership are waived, as under the
House bill, if the shareholder does not reacquire, other than by bequest
or inheritance, an interest (other than an interest as a creditor), for a
period of 10 years thereafter.
Id. at 45, reprinted in 2 REAMS, supra note 29, at 45 (emphasis added). Thus, the
Senate version of § 302(c)(2)(A) both agreed with and incorporated the House's
desire to provide an easily ascertainable standard for shareholders to waive fam-
ily attribution.
52. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 56-521, 1956-2 C.B. 174 (stating that shareholder's redemption
of only one of his two classes of stock in the corporation would not qualify under
§ 302(b)(3)); Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965) (discussing generally
the termination of interest problems of section 302(b)(3)). For a general discus-
sion of § 302(b)(3), see B. BrrrxER & J. EusTIcE, supra note 20, 9.23, at 9-22 to 9-
24; Gardner & Randall, Distributions in Redemption of Stockh Changing Defini-
tions for a Termination of Interest, 8 J. CORP. TAX'N 240, 241-44 (1981).
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302(c)(2)(A) prohibited interest.5 3
The Service generally adheres to a strict interpretation of section
302(c)(2)(A), maintaining that a shareholder will have a post-redemp-
tion prohibited interest if he retains or acquires 54 a voting interest,55
interest as an officer,56 interest in the corporation assets,5 7 or provides
services to the corporation.58 Notwithstanding this narrow reading of
section 302(c)(2)(A), the Service occasionally measures the extent of
the retained interest, and if it is relatively less than that of a creditor's,
the service will not consider it a prohibited interest.59
Prior to 1984, the Tax Court had required a showing of a financial
or managerial interest as a prerequisite to a finding of a prohibited
interest.60 In Seda and Lynch, however, the court established a nar-
rower test that represents a more literal interpretation of section
302(c)(2)(A).61
A. Prohibited Voting Interest
Section 302(c)(2)(A) prohibits the retention of any interest in the
corporation, including, as stated in its parenthetical language, an inter-
est as officer, director or employee. 62 If a shareholder retains the
power to vote any remaining stock following a section 302(b)(3) re-
demption, he retains an interest in the corporation.63 This change in
stock ownership is considered a change in form only and is precisely
the type of interest retention that section 302(c)(2) prohibits.64 Ac-
cordingly, in Revenue Ruling 71-426,65 the Service stated that a share-
holder's retention of his position as trustee of a voting trust for his
children constituted a section 302(c)(2)(A) prohibited interest.66
53. See supra notes 12-29 and accompanying text (discussing the mechanics of the
prohibited interest).
54. A shareholder cannot retain or obtain a prohibited interest within 10 years after
the redemption. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A).
55. See Rev. Rul. 71-426, 1971-2 C.B. 173.
56. See Rev. Rul. 75-2, 1975-1 C.B. 99.
57. See Rev. Rul. 56-556, 1956-2 C.B. 177.
58. See Rev. Rul. 70-104, 1970-1 C.B. 66.
59. See Rev. Rul. 77-467, 1977-2 C.B. 92.
60. Chertkof v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 113 (1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981);
Estate of Lennard v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 554 (1974) (nonacq.).
61. See infra notes 188-218 and accompanying text.
62. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(i).
63. Although § 302(c)(2)(A) does not expressly prohibit a power to vote, the power to
control the corporation's affairs falls easily within the prohibited interest term.
Rose, supra note 34, at 158.
64. See Bittker, supra note 17, at 34 (§ 302(c)(2)(B) frustrates redemptions that are in
form only and that do not terminate the stockholder's control over his family's
stock interests).
65. 1971-2 C.B. 173.
66. Nor can an ex-shareholder serve within 10 years of his redemption as custodian of
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The Service will permit, however, an ex-shareholder to acquire the
power to vote the stock if it is acquired through bequest or inheri-
tance. In Revenue Ruling 79-334,67 the Service ruled that an ex-share-
holder's appointment, through a will, as trustee of a voting trust did
not constitute the acquiring of a prohibited interest. A similar ap-
pointment as an executor, which entails the power to vote the estate's
stock, also did not violate section 302(c)(2)(A). 6s In both instances, the
Service characterized the devised voting power as an "interest ac-
quired by bequest or inheritance," a permissible interest under section
302(c)(2)(A). 69
This analogy accurately reflects the congressional intent embodied
in section 302(c)(2)(A). If a testator desires to leave outright the stock
to an ex-shareholder, the ex-shareholder will not suffer adverse tax
consequences under section 302(c)(2)(A).7 0 The ex-shareholder's tem-
porary voting power as executor permits the satisfaction of the testa-
tor's wishes without sacrificing a disruption of the corporate
business.71 A prohibition of this temporary voting power would likely
force a testator to devise the stock either to minors not capable of run-
ning the corporation or to individuals outside the family unit.72 Thus,
stock given, pursuant to the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, to his child by the
remaining shareholders. Rev. Rul. 81-233, 1981-2 C.3. 83.
67. 1979-2 C.B. 127.
68. In Rev. Rul. 72-380, 1972-2 C.B. 201, two brothers who had previously effected
§ 302(b)(3) redemptions were appointed by their father's will as his estate execu-
tors within 10 years following their redemptions. Their positions as executors
gave them the power to vote the stock of their deceased father, who had been the
sole shareholder. The Service ruled that the brothers' voting power acquired as
executors did not constitute a prohibited interest.
69. The receipt of a direct interest in stock through bequest or inheritance is permit-
ted by § 302(c)(2)(A)(ii). By analogy, the receipt through bequest or inheritance
of an executor or trustee position that may vote the stock is similar. Rev. Rul. 72-
380, 1972-2 C.B. 201; Rev. Rul. 79-334, 1979-2 C.B. 127. Cf. Rev. Rul. 75-2, 1975-1
C.B. 99, (discussed infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text).
70. Section 302(c)(2)(A)(ii) would not prohibit an interest acquired within 10 years
from the date of the redemption by bequest or inheritance.
71. While the estate is probated, the corporation's business continues. A temporary
abstention of the right to vote stock during the probate proceedings could result
in a lack of timely and necessary business decisions. The right to vote the stock
during this period should be granted to another family member.
72. The testator will usually devise the stock into trust with its distribution withheld
until the beneficiaries come of age. The trustee who has the power to vote the
stock is usually the children's parent. If no other family members existed, the
testator would be forced to appoint a trustee for the minors' stock from outside
the family group. An outsider with a power to vote the corporation stock would
disrupt the exclusive family control.
The rationale of Rev. Rul. 71-426 provides an interesting hypothetical. Sup-
pose Father and Son A each own 50% of the corporation. Son B exchanged his
stock in a corporate redemption less than 10 years ago. Father dies and leaves his
stock in trust to the children of Son B. Father's will appoints Son B as trustee.
Revenue Ruling 71-426 apparently would permit this arrangement. Son A, how-
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the temporary voting power permitted by the Service is analogous to
the "bequest or inheritance" exception to acquiring a prohibited
interest.
The analogy fails, however, when the ex-shareholder abuses this
temporary power. In Revenue Ruling 75-2, 73 two brothers, who had
previously effected section 302(b)(3) redemptions, were appointed ex-
ecutors of their father's estate. In that capacity they had the power to
vote the stock of their deceased father, who himself had been the cor-
poration's sole shareholder. The brothers exercised their voting
power and elected one of them as president of the corporation. The
ruling states that the brother elected president had acquired a prohib-
ited interest.74
Revenue Ruling 75-2 permits an executor to obtain a voting inter-
est, but prohibits the executor's actual exercise of that voting interest
to elect himself to corporate office. The power to vote shares that con-
trol corporate policy and choose corporate officers is commonly con-
sidered an interest greater than that of an officer. The Service's
rationale may be to maintain, for administrative ease, a per se prohibi-
tion of any section 302(c)(2)(A)(ii) enumerated interest. Alterna-
tively, the Service may regard executor voting power as temporary in
nature which, once acquired, should not be exploited to gain any
greater or additional interest.75
B. Providing Services
1. Lewis v. Commissioner
The Tax Court's prohibited interest test of a "financial or manage-
rial stake" in the corporation initially appeared in Judge Simpson's
ever, could act as trustee without corporate control leaving the family. Should
the father be forced to bequest his corporate interest to Son A, who has not previ-
ously effected a § 302 redemption? One could argue that a child's parent as
trustee will better provide for the child's interest. This factor alone should per-
mit Son B to remain as trustee. Section 302(c)(2)(A) does not turn, however, on
such interests but prevents a shareholder from obtaining an interest unless by
bequest or inheritance.
73. 1975-1 C.B. 99.
74. Section 302(c)(2)(A)(i) prohibits the acquiring of an interest as an officer in the
corporation. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(i). Cf. Lewis v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 129, 137-
38 (1966) (The retention of positions as director and officer in title only with no
compensation or duties does not constitute a prohibited interest.)
75. The Service's position may be that an executor's temporary voting power gives
him a legal interest in the stock but that the equitable interest remains in the
stock's intended beneficiary. The Service might view an executor's voting of him-
self into office as an abuse of his temporary power which is not in the best inter-
ests of the stock's intended beneficiary. If the executor in Rev. Rul. 75-2 had also
been the stock's intended beneficiary, then he would have held both a legal and
an equitable interest in the stock. Had the executor held both interests, the Ser-
vice might have permitted the executor's election of himself into office.
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concurring opinion in Lewis v. Commissioner.76 In Lewis the peti-
tioner incorporated his business in 1950 after operating it as a sole pro-
prietorship for twenty-four years. From 1950 to 1956, Lewis reduced
his corporate services to consulting and advising, on a limited basis, his
two sons who had bought corporate stock. In 1956, at the age of sixty-
nine, Lewis decided to retire to a life of farming. He resigned as presi-
dent on June 11, 1956, but remained on the board of directors and was
elected vice president. On July 1, 1956, the corporation entered into a
redemption agreement with Lewis for his approximate one-half own-
ership. After July 1, the corporation discontinued Lewis' salary and
he neither rendered services to the corporation nor actively exercised
any powers as director or vice president. Although he attended infor-
mal directors meetings, he did not participate in any of the
deliberations. 77
In an opinion rendered by the entire Tax Court, the court held that
Lewis' redemption was not "essentially equivalent to a dividend."78 In
reaching its decision, the court neither utilized section 302(b)(3) nor
reached the question of whether a taxpayer's nominal retention of a
position as director or officer violates section 302(c)(2)(A).79
In his concurring opinion, Judge Simpson agreed with the major-
ity's result but disagreed with the court's failure to apply both the
family attribution rules and the section 302(b)(3) test.8 0 He stated that
section 302(c)(2)(A)(i) merely provides that a prohibited interest may
include an interest as an officer or director but does not prohibit office
holding per se.81 Lewis, according to Judge Simpson, held merely the
title of officer and director, which did not amount to an interest that
Congress intended to prohibit. Instead, Congress was concerned with
nominal stock transfers that had no effect on corporate management
and transfers in which the shareholder retained a financial stake.8 2
After Lewis, the Service articulated in Revenue Ruling 70-10483 its
strict view of the section 302(c)(2)(A) "interest." The Service's ruling
stated that an ex-shareholder providing consulting services to the cor-
poration after his redemption constituted a prohibited interest. In
that ruling, a father effected a section 302(b)(3) redemption within a
family owned corporation. After the redemption, the father entered
76. 47 T.C. 129 (1966).
77. Id at 130-31.
78. Id. at 132-36. The majority utilized the § 302(b)(1) analysis and found that Lewis'
redemption qualified for capital gains treatment. The finding of nondividend
equivalency disposed of the necessity to analyze whether the taxpayer had com-
plied with §§ 302(b)(3) and 302(c). Id at 132.
79. Id. at 135.
80. Id at 136.
81. Id. at 137.
82. Id-
83. 1970-1 C.B. 66 (1970).
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into a five-year consulting agreement with the corporation. The Ser-
vice maintained that the father's provision of services pursuant to the
agreement was a prohibited interest under section 302(c)(2)(A).
2. Estate of Lennard v. Commissioner
The Tax Court analyzed Revenue Ruling 70-104 in Estate of Len-
nard v. Commissioner.8 4 In Lennard, the petitioner had initially con-
tributed $100,000 to Gerald Metals, a corporation formed by
petitioner's son, and in return had received approximately a one-third
interest. Lennard's son served as president, director and manager of
the corporation. Lennard himself also served as director and secre-
tary-treasurer and provided general accounting services for the corpo-
ration on a monthly basis. Upon his redemption in September, 1965,
Lennard resigned as president and director. Following the redemp-
tion and until Lennard's death in 1970, Lennard's accounting firm pro-
vided Gerald Metals general accounting services, including annual
audits in 1965 and 1966. Lennard's duties as managing partner of the
Gerald Metals account included preparing Metal's tax returns and
monthly audits, both requiring only a few days work. In addition to
acting as trustee for Metals' pension plan since its inception in 1965,
Lennard assisted in establishing a procedure to stop inventory loss in
1970. Sometime in 1965 or 1966 he advised his son regarding the acqui-
sition of a refinery. Gerald Metals subsequently made that
acquisition.8 5
The Tax Court held that Lennard provided his services to Metals
in an independent capacity.86 He acted, therefore, not in the capacity
of an employee under the control of the corporation but as an in-
dependent contractor.8 7 Distinguishing Revenue Ruling 70-10488 as
applying only to interests retained as employees, the court relied on
the concurring opinion in Lewis, noting that the congressional concern
behind section 302(c)(2) was a retained financial interest or a nominal
stock transfer with no change in corporate management.8 9 Congress,
84. 61 T.C. 554 (1974)(nonacq.).
85. Id at 555-59.
86. Id at 560-61. The court held that Lennard acted as a partner in his accounting
firm when rendering accounting services to Metals. As an accountant, he carried
on an independent employment pursuant to an arrangement with Metals by
which he had complete control over his accounting work and the manner of its
employment. Id at 561.
87. The court stated that no evidence existed indicating Lennard performed work as
an employee. Id.
88. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (describing the facts of Rev. Rul. 70-
104). The court stated that Lennard's performance of services was of a prescribed
nature that was "far more circumscribed than the broader consultant and advi-
sory services" rendered by the taxpayer in Rev. Rul. 70-104. Estate of Lennard v.
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 554, 560 (1974) (nonacq.).
89. Estate of Leonard v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 554, 561 (1974), (nonacq.).
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the court stated, had in mind a corporate involvement greater than
that of a third party providing goods or services to the corporation." 90
3. Chertkof v. Commissioner
The Tax Court distinguished Lennard in Chertkof v. Commis-
sioner,9 ' holding that the taxpayer had retained a prohibited interest
in entering into a property management contract with the corporation
after the redemption. Chertkof had redeemed his approximate one-
third interest in E & T Realty Co., a family owned corporation. In
return for his shares, Chertkof received a one-third undivided interest
in E & T's realty and remaining assets. E & T then entered into an
agreement with Chertkof in which E & T agreed to manage his one-
third property interest for ten years. Chertkof, after obtaining a
favorable letter ruling from the Service stating that his redemption
would receive capital gains treatment, resigned as an officer and direc-
tor and redeemed his stock in February, 1966.92
In June or July of the same year, Chertkof was approached by his
father's attorney, who asked Chertkof to consider managing E & T's
properties since the father, an officer with E & T, could no longer
oversee the properties because of his declining health. On August 31,
1966, J.O. Chertkof Co., owned eighty percent by Chertkof and twenty
percent by his wife and sons, entered into a property management
contract with E & T. The company had not previously managed any
property. The agreement with E & T gave J.O. Chertkof Co. exclusive
power to negotiate, procure, and execute all leases on behalf of E & T.
Moreover, E & T authorized the company to collect rents, make ex-
penditures, and keep records with respect to the properties. 93
The Tax Court held that Chertkof's property management con-
tract with E & T created a prohibited interest under section
302(c)(2)(A). Unlike the services provided by the taxpayer in Len-
nard, Chertkof's services went to the essence of the purpose for E &
T's existence. Chertkof's broad and unrestrained management powers
over both the properties and E & T's corporate policy made him an
integral part of E & T's business.94
Chertkof acquired greater control over E & T under the property
management contract than what he had prior to the redemption.95
90. IE
91. 72 T.C. 1113 (1979), aLffd, 649 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981).
92. 72 T.C. 1117-18.
93. Id. at 1118-19.
94. Id at 1124-25.
95. Prior to the redemption, Chertkof's father had controlled corporate policy. In
fact, the redemption occurred as a result of petitioner's continual disagreement
with his father's corporate policy decisions. Chertkof's powers under the prop-
erty management contract were in no way limited by any corporate policy estab-
lished by his father. Id. at 1125.
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Unlike the facts of Lennard, E & T could not terminate Chertkof's
contract at any time.96 Thus, Chertkof stood to gain financially
through his one-third property interest as a result of his own manage-
ment duties.97 After examining the "financial or managerial test" of
Lewis, the Tax Court concluded that Chertkof had acquired a prohib-
ited interest.
The Tax Court's required finding of a retained financial or mana-
gerial interest in the corporation by the ex-shareholder is an unwar-
ranted interpretation of the congressional intent behind section
302(c)(2)(A). The court's prohibited interest interpretation requires
the exact facts and circumstances inquiry that Congress intended to
avoid.98 Congress intended to bring certainty to the redemption area
by providing definite standards through which taxpayers could con-
struct their transactions. 99
4. Analysis of Lewis, Lennard and Chertkof
In Lewis, Judge Simpson's concurring opinion stated that section
302(c)(2)(A) did not prohibit office holding per se but that it did pro-
hibit a retained financial stake or an interest in the corporate manage-
rial affairs.100 While Judge Simpson recognized that the congressional
intent favored a bona fide severance of the shareholder's interest in
order to qualify for capital gains treatment,101 he failed to recognize
the predominant congressional concern to introduce easily ascertain-
able standards into the redemption area.10 2 Although Congress codi-
fied the "essentially equivalent to a dividend" standard of pre-1954 law
in section 302(b)(1),103 it did not intend to include a similar individual
factual inquiry in the other codified redemption standards.1 0 4 Rather,
Congress intended that section 302(c)(2) (A) provide a mechanical and
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1125-26.
98. H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 29, at A72-A73, reprinted in 1 REAMS, supra note
29, at A72-A73.
99. Id. at A73, reprinted in 1 REAMS, supra note 29, at A73. See supra notes 36-38 and
accompanying text.
100. Lewis v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 129, 137-38 (1966).
101. Id. at 137.
102. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing the need for certainty in
the redemption area).
103. Section 115(g) of the 1939 Code states that a redemption resulting in a corporate
distribution essentially equivalent to a dividend will not qualify for capital gains
treatment. The essentially equivalent to a dividend standard required an analysis
of all surrounding facts and circumstances. Reg. 118, § 39.115(g)-1(a)(2) (1940).
See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertainties preva-
lent in the facts and circumstances inquiry under pre-1954 law).
104. The redemption standards available under § 302(b), other than those contained in
§ 302(b)(1), provide definitive and easily administered standards. H.R. REP. No.
1337, supra note 29, at A72-A73, reprinted in 1 REAMS, supra note 29, at A72-A73;
S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 30, at 233, reprinted in 2 REAMS, supra note 29, at
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objective means to waive family stock attribution.105
Judge Simpson, in stating that a prohibited interest required the
finding of either a retained financial or managerial interest in the cor-
poration, cited an article that proposed a similar inquiry.106 The arti-
cle stated that section 302(c)(2)(A) is not without its ambiguities 107
and explained that the Service, in interpreting pre-1954 law, had indi-
cated in Revenue Ruling 54-408108 that the mere performance of serv-
ices after a redemption would not constitute a prohibited "interest in
the affairs of the corporation." 0 9 This ruling, the article stated, sug-
gests a need to find more than employment to constitute a section
302(c)(2)(A) prohibited interest.1 10
The article, however, confuses the complete termination standard
of section 302(b)(3) with the prohibited interest of section
302(c)(2)(A)(i).1l Revenue Ruling 54-408, cited by the author of the
article, analyzes the post-redemption employment of an ex-share-
holder by a corporation in which none of his family holds a stock in-
terest. The family stock attribution waiver of section 302(c)(2)(A),
therefore, is not applicable. In addition, the ruling utilizes a redemp-
tion standard stated in the regulations under section 115(g) of the 1939
Code.132 This complete termination standard was codified in section
302(b)(3) of the 1954 Code.113 In summary, the revenue ruling is not
concerned with the section 302(c)(2)(A) prohibited interest factors.
Section 302(c)(2)(A) prohibits a much broader interest than does
section 302(b)(3). The latter prohibits only a retained equity interest
233. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' elimina-
tion of the facts and circumstances inquiry).
105. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
106. Judge Simpson cited Bittker, supra note 17, at 33 n.72 (1956). Lewis v. Commis-
sioner, 47 T.C. 129, 138 n.3 (1966).
107. Bittker, supra note 17, at 33.
108. 1954-2 C.B. 165. The ruling states that the ex-stockholder, who was a majority
shareholder prior to the redemption of all his shares, was to remain in the employ
of the corporation for four years. The ex-shareholder would train key employees
to assume his prior duties and would introduce them to his personal contacts.
During the same period he was to receive his present salary but would sever all
other corporate interests, including his positions as officer and director. The ex-
shareholder had no relationships with any other shareholder and no member of
his family was associated with the corporation. Id
109. The regulations accompanying 1939 Code § 115(g) stated that a complete redemp-
tion of all the shareholder's stock, so that he ceases to be interested in the affairs
of the corporation, qualifies for capital gain treatment. Reg. 118, § 39.115(g)-
1(a)(2) (1940). The phrase "ceases to be interested in the affairs of the corpora-
tion" was interpreted as a cessation of the shareholder's equity interest. See
supra note 34.
110. Bittker, supra note 17, at 33 n.72.
111. Rose, supra note 34, at 147-48.
112. See supra note 109.
113. H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 29, at A73, reprinted in 1 REAMs, supra note 29, at
A73.
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in the corporation, 14 whereas section 302(c)(2)(A) prohibits an inter-
est in the corporation, including that of an officer, shareholder, or di-
rector.1 15 A waiver of family stock attribution under section
302(c)(2)(A) is available only to shareholders effecting a complete
stock interest termination under section 302(b)(3).116 Without the
broader prohibited interests of section 302(c)(2)(A), the Service would
face a burdensome task in determining when family attribution of
stock ownership should apply. Congress intended section 302(c)(2)(A)
to provide certainty in the redemption area that would create redemp-
tion "safe harbors" and in turn relieve administrative burdens of the
Service.117 A factual inquiry into the substantive financial and mana-
gerial interests retained by the ex-shareholder was not a congressional
objective.
The legislative history of section 302(c)(2)(A) reflects no desire by
Congress to elevate form over substance. Contrary to Judge Simp-
son's interpretation in Lewis,"18 Congress did intend to prohibit office
holding per se for individuals who in fact act as officers, directors, or
employees. Without this per se prohibition, section 302(c)(2)(A)
would not provide a clear standard for taxpayers structuring
redemptions.
In Lennard, the Tax Court held that the distributee had rendered
services in an independent capacity that was not prohibited by section
302(c)(2)(A).119 Utilizing the Lewis retained "financial or managerial
interest in the corporation" standard, the Lennard court concluded
that Congress did not intend to prohibit services equivalent to those
provided by a third party.1 2 0 In its analysis, the court neglected to ad-
dress the congressional concern that shareholders should sever all ties
with the corporation. Instead, the court concentrated on the nature of
the accounting services provided by the petitioner and held that sup-
plying those services did not allow him to exert control over his son.12 '
Mr. Lennard, notwithstanding his stock interest termination, had
severed only a few of his ties with the corporation. He continued to
provide monthly accounting services to the corporation, and advised
the corporation on an inventory maintenance plan and the purchase of
114. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
116. A shareholder not completely terminating his equity interest in the corporation
would fail § 302(b)(3) and never reach the prohibited interest test of
§ 302(c)(2)(A).
117. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
118. Lewis v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 129, 137 (1966). But see Seda v. Commissioner, 82
T.C. 484, 491 (1984) (Whitaker, J., concurring) (Congress did intend to prohibit
the retention of all employment relationships).
119. Estate of Lennard v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 554, 560-61 (1974) (nonacq.).
120. Id, at 561.
121. I& at 562.
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a new refinery. Although the court emphasized that Lennard had no
control over his son, who made all corporate policy decisions,122 it
failed to address the objective tests of family stock attribution ex-
pressed in the legislative history of section 302(c)(2)(A).123
The Lennard court emphasized that Lennard's independent con-
tractor status distinguished his interest from the interest prohibited in
Revenue Ruling 70-104.124 That ruling characterized a five-year man-
agement consulting agreement between the distributee and the corpo-
ration as a prohibited interest. Neither the ruling nor the legislative
history of section 302(c)(2)(A) indicates a need to distinguish between
an employee and an independent contractor in determining whether a
prohibited interest has been retained. However, section 302(c)(2)(A)
prohibits an interest in the corporation including that of an officer,
director, or employee.125 The parenthetical language of section
302(c)(2)(A) does not limit the extent of the interest but merely pro-
vides examples of prohibited interests.12 6 In addition, the court ap-
plied the common law test of employer control to determine if
Lennard was an employee of the corporation.127 This initial inquiry to
determine whether a corporation controls an individual appears mis-
guided in light of Congress' desire to prohibit the individual from con-
trolling the corporation.
The Chertkof court also applied the Lewis standard of retained fi-
nancial or managerial interest in the corporation. 2 8 Chertkof had for-
mally agreed to manage the corporation's properties. Unlike the
services provided by the taxpayer in Lennard, Chertkof's services
were not circumscribed by the corporation. 129 The court found that
these management powers provided Chertkof exclusive corporate con-
122. Id
123. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
124. Estate of Lennard v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 554, 560-61 (1974) (nonacq.). See
supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing Rev. Rul. 70-104).
125. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(i).
126. The Senate report defines the § 302(c)(2)(A)(i) interest as including, but not lim-
ited to, an interest as officer, director, or employee. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note
30, at 236, reprinted in 2 REAMs, supra note 29, at 236.
127. The court thought it necessary to determine the character of Lennard's employ-
ment status in order to conclude whether he fell within the parenthetical lan-
guage of § 302(c)(2)(A)(i). Estate of Lennard v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 554, 561
(1974) (nonacq.). The court used Employment Tax Regs. § 31.3402(c)-1(c), for
guidance in determining if he was an employee of the corporation. Estate of Len-
nard v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 554, 561 (1974) (nonacq.). The cited employment
regulations utilize the common law test of control wherein all surrounding facts
and circumstances are analyzed to determine if the employer controls the service
provider.
128. Chertkof v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1113, 1126 (1979), affd, 649 F.2d 264 (4th Cir.
1981).
129. Mr. Chertkof had exclusive power to negotiate, procure, and execute all leases on
behalf of the corporation. I at 1124.
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trol and the ability to benefit financially from its operations.1 3 0 Sec-
tion 302(c)(2)(A) does not require an inquiry into the substance of the
shareholder's retained interest, thus the Ciertkof court could have
found a prohibited interest on the mere existence of the petitioner's
contract to provide services. The incomplete severance of his corpo-
rate ties constituted a prohibited interest regardless of his characteri-
zation as an employee or an independent contractor.
C. Interest Greater than that of a Creditor
Section 302(c) (2) (A) expressly exempts from prohibited interests a
retained interest as a creditor.1 31 The exemption prevents corporate
cash flow problems by permitting corporations to exchange debt in-
struments in lieu of cash to fund redemption agreements.132 In fact,
the Service does not restrict the exempted creditor's interest to mere
corporate indebtedness existing at, or resulting from, the redemption.
On the contrary, the Service permits arm's length leasing transactions
between the ex-shareholder and the corporation since these transac-
tions create an interest in the ex-shareholder no greater than that of a
creditor.133
The related section 302(c)(2)(A) regulations make it clear that a
creditor's interest with respect to the corporation cannot include
rights against the corporation broader than those necessary to enforce
the creditor's claim.134 The Service amplified this restriction in Reve-
nue Ruling 59-119.135 The ruling, citing the above regulations, states
that a distributee cannot reserve a right to appoint a director to the
130. Id at 1126.
131. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(i).
132. The legislative history under § 302 gives no indication of Congress's rationale un-
derlying its choice of a creditor exemption. See supra note 45 and accompanying
text (discussing commentators' views agreeing with the corporate cash-flow prob-
lem as the rationale underlying the creditor exemption).
133. Rev. Rul. 77-467, 1977-2 C.B. 92.
134. Reg. § 1.302-4(d) reads as follows:
Sec. 1.302-4 Termination of shareholder's interest.
(d) For the purpose of Section 302(c)(2)(A)(i), a person will be con-
sidered to be a creditor only if the rights of such person with respect to
the corporation are not greater or broader in scope than necessary for
the enforcement of his claim. Such claim must not in any sense be pro-
prietary and must not be subordinate to the claims of general creditors.
An obligation in the form of a debt may thus constitute a proprietary
interest. For example, if under the terms of the instrument the corpora-
tion may discharge the principal amount of its obligation to a person by
payments, the amount or certainty of which are dependent upon the
earnings of the corporation, such a person is not a creditor of the corpo-
ration. Furthermore, if under the terms of the instrument the rate of
purported interest is dependent upon earnings, the holder of such instru-
ment may not, in some cases, be a creditor.
135. Rev. Rul. 59-119, 1959-1 C.B. 68.
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corporate board for the purpose of protecting his creditor interests.
The Service maintains that the limiting by the remaining shareholders
of the director's duties to a mere policing of his creditor's interest is
immaterial 36 since section 302(c)(2)(A) makes no exceptions for di-
rectors,1 3 7 actual or appointed.
The regulations additionally state that ex-shareholders having
creditor interests that are in "any sense proprietary and subordinate
to the claims of general creditors," have greater rights than necessary
to enforce their claims.138 Debt obligations, thus, may constitute pro-
prietary interests, particularly when their repayment is directly re-
lated to corporate profits. 39 Debt repayment subject to sufficient
corporate earnings is usually a factor in determining whether a debt
instrument constitutes equity.140 Section 302(c)(2)(A), which applies
only to complete terminations of stock interests under section
302(b)(3), necessitates a broader reading of "proprietary interest."141
The degree of equitable interest found in a prohibited, proprietary in-
terest, as defined by the regulations, is less than that of an equitable
interest reclassified as stock, but greater than that of a creditor's
interest.
The Service has ruled that some corporate obligations, but not
strict indebtedness, result in the ex-shareholder having a corporate in-
terest no greater than that of a creditor. In Revenue Ruling 84-135,142
the taxpayer received payments pursuant to a pre-existing, unfunded
pension agreement after the full redemption of his shares in a family
owned corporation. The Service ruled that the taxpayer's interest,
which was no greater than that of a creditor's, was not a prohibited
one. This ruling emphasizes that the pension payments were neither
dependent on corporate profits nor subordinate to the claims of gen-
eral creditors.143
Similarly, in Revenue Ruling 77-467,144 the Service stated that a
leasing transaction, bargained at arm's length, between the corpora-
tion and ex-shareholder did not constitute an interest greater than
that of a creditor. The taxpayer in the ruling had entered into a ten-
136. I. at 70.
137. Id.
138. Reg. § 1.302-4(d).
139. Id. See supra note 134 (discussing Reg. § 1.302-4(d)).
140. See generally B. BrrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 20, 4.03, at 4-8 to 4-10.
141. In order to avail oneself of the § 302(c)(2)(A) waiver, the shareholder must have
terminated his complete stock ownership pursuant to § 302(b)(3). I.R.C.
§ 302(c)(2)(A). The term stock ownership includes debt obligations reclassified as
equity. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
142. Rev. Rul. 84-135, 1984-2 C.B. 80.
143. Id The emphasis on corporate earnings and subordination derives from Reg.
§ 1.302-4(d).
144. Rev. Rul. 77-467, 1977-2 C.B. 92.
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year lease of an office building to the corporation five years before his
redemption. The Service warned, however, that an interest greater
than that of a creditor would result if the rent payments were either
dependent on corporate earnings or subordinate to future creditors.145
Although both the pension obligation and lease agreement resem-
ble creditor interests, the pension obligation more closely mirrors the
indebtedness anticipated and permitted by Congress in section
302(c)(2)(A).1 46 Similar to redemption indebtedness or pre-existing
indebtedness, the pension obligation represents a sum certain that
would cause corporate solvency problems if section 302(c)(2)(A) re-
quired its full and immediate payment upon redemption,147 whereas
the lease agreement falls outside of this interpretation of exempted
creditor interests and represents a continuing interest by the share-
holder in the corporation.148 A leasing transaction enables the share-
holder to lease potentially necessary assets to the corporation's
business. Similar to a prohibited employee relationship in which the
individual provides services for a fee, the lessor provides an asset for
the lessee's use for a fee.149 Simply, any post-redemption dealings
with the corporation that provide the distributee with an interest in
the assets of the corporation should be prohibited. The fact that the
transaction appears to have been bargained at arm's length should be
irrelevant. Congress attempted to avoid the administrative problems
associated with determining when one family member influences an-
other by providing definitive standards in section 302.150 Congress did
not intend that the Service or the Courts measure the extent of the
creditor's interest.
In addition to the discussion of proprietary interests, the regula-
tions state that a distributee must not subordinate his note to a general
creditor.151 In Lennard, the petitioner subordinated his note to the
145. I- The Service declared that it will not issue private letter rulings as to whether
a rental agreement is dependent on corporate profits. Rev. Proc. 77-45, 1977-2
C.B. 579. A fixed rental agreement is not a rental agreement dependent on prof-
its. M "Fixed rental" includes rent computed on a fixed percentage of corporate
sale receipts. Id
146. See supra note 45.
147. See supra note 45 (discussing the intent behind the creditor exception of
§ 302(c)(2)(A)).
148. See Rose, supra note 34, at 159-61. A family corporation could argue that, similar
to the hardship that would result if it were forced to immediately pay off in cash
all pre-existing indebtedness to the distributee, the immediate termination of the
pre-existing lease could result in the loss of an essential business asset. The hard-
ship of lease termination might parallel the funding of all pre-existing debt. The
lease, especially one entered into post-redemption, provides the continuing inter-
action by the distributee in corporate affairs that Congress attempted to prevent.
149. Rose, supra note 34, at 160-61.
150. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
151. Reg. § 1.302-4(d).
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other creditors of the corporation.152 The court utilized a debt/equity
analysis of the redemption obligation to determine if the retained in-
terest exceeded that of a creditor's. 5 3 In response to the regulations,
the Lennard court held that the regulations required both a finding of
a proprietary interest and subordination for the creditor's claim to
constitute a prohibited interest.1 54
A literal reading of the Lennard court's interpretation of Regula-
tion section 1.302-4(d) would not result in the existence of a proprie-
tary interest when a claim had proprietary attributes but no
subordination.155 The Lennard court probably intended its statement
to mean that the regulations define only when the element of subordi-
nation will determine a creditor's interest as prohibited. The regula-
tions state, however, that the claim "may not in any sense be
proprietary ... .,,156 Accordingly, the discovery of any proprietary
element, including subordination, would render the creditor's claim
prohibited. Although such a view is consistent with the congressional
desire for a distributee to sever all corporate connections, it does not
reflect the underlying policy for the creditor exemption-to prevent
corporate solvency problems. 57
A normal debtor-creditor relationship involves the transfer of a se-
curity interest in the debtor's property to the creditor. The security
interest permits the secured party the right to control the debtor's dis-
position of the security. The interest and control in corporate assets is
152. Estate of Lennard v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 554, 557-58 (1974) (nonac.).
153. I& at 562-63. The Lennard court defined a proprietary interest as a debt obliga-
tion redefined as capital as a result of its subjection to the risks of the business.
Id at 562. The court cited Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118, 125-26
(2d Cir. 1956), for the proposition that "debt is still debt despite subordination."
The Kr ft decision involved a debt-equity issue. The proprietary interest prohib-
ited pursuant to § 302(c)(2)(A) is less than that of an equitable interest. See
supra notes 138-141 and accompanying text.
154. Estate of Lennard v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 554, 557-58 (1974) (nonacq.).
155. The court stated that it must conjunctively read the regulation language requir-
ing a proprietary interest and subordination. Id.
156. Reg. § 1.302-4(d) (emphasis added).
157. If subordination alone could render a distributee's redemption debt a prohibited
interest, few corporations could effect redemptions. Generally, small, family held
corporations must subordinate shareholder loans in order to obtain large capital
improvement loans. A financial institution generally will ask for the same subor-
dination from an ex-shareholder. Prohibition of mere subordination of redemp-
tion obligations would thus prevent many redemptions.
The courts have permitted the subordination of debt to third-party restric-
tions. Thus, local law restrictions on note repayment terms, Harlan v. U.S., 409
F.2d 904, 909 (5th Cir. 1969), and the corporate charter restrictions on indebted-
ness repayment, Commissioner v. Union Mut. Ins. Co., 386 F.2d 974, 976-78 (1st
Cir. 1967), if complied with will not generally constitute a prohibited interest.
The courts focus on the need of the third party to accomplish its legitimate busi-
ness objectives and the effect of furthering the creditor's interests. Dunn v. Com-
missioner, 70 T.C. 715, 729 (1978), affd, 615 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1980).
1986]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
no greater than that of a normal creditor's and is consequently not a
section 302(c)(2)(A) prohibited interest. Regulation section 1.302-4(e)
further provides that a distributee may enforce his security interest
and acquire corporate assets on an obligation default by the corpora-
tion.158 This asset acquisition will not constitute a prohibited section
302(c)(2) interest unless corporate stock is acquired.159 The courts
have construed the regulations to prohibit the acquiring of stock but to
permit the right to acquire the stockl 60 because the pledge of stock is a
condition found in normal creditor relationships.161 However, this in-
terpretation disregards the need for objective methods to determine if
the distributee has severed corporate ties.162 The Service, on the other
hand, views the mere right to acquire stock due to claim enforcement
as an interest potentially greater than that of a creditor.63
V. THE TAX COURT'S STRICTER STANDARD
A. Seda v. Commissioner
In 1984, the full Tax Court had another chance to review the pro-
hibited interest standard. In Seda v. Commissioner,16 4 the petitioner
was the sole shareholder of a corporation, which in June, 1979, re-
deemed all of Seda's stock in the corporation. The corporation concur-
rently issued 1000 shares of common stock to Seda's son, James, whom
the corporation had employed for seven years. On the date of redemp-
tion, Seda resigned as officer and director. At his son's insistence,
however, Seda remained employed by the corporation at a salary of
$1,000 per month.165 In June, 1981, Seda terminated his employment
158. Reg. § 1.302-4(e).
159. id-
160. Lynch v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 597, 610 (1984).
161. Id
162. Although the pledge of stock is normal in a creditor relationship, a redemption
obligation from a family held corporation is not a normal debtor-creditor rela-
tionship. The general proposition is that family members will be influenced by
and respectful of other family members' interests. A family held corporation
might pre-arrange with the distributee to purposely default on the redemption
obligation and transfer corporate control back to the distributee. Although Reg.
§ 1.302-4(e) prohibits a distributee from acquiring stock through the enforcement
of his security interest, the courts have not yet encountered that fact situation. If
the courts refused to permit the stock acquisition, then their allowance of the
mere pledging of stock would be rendered meaningless. Section 302(c)(2)(A) pro-
hibits the distributee from regaining corporate control. In addition, the adminis-
trative burden of determining whether an arms-length transaction has occurred
between family members has resulted in the need for definitive standards that
assure the severance of the distributee from corporate affairs.
163. Rev. Proc. 72-9, 1972-1 C.B. 719.
164. 82 T.C. 484 (1984).
165. An accountant had advised against the corporation's employment of Seda after
his redemption. Id. at 486. The court dismissed this fact as not controlling. Id- at
488.
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relationship with the company upon learning of the potential adverse
tax consequences. 166
The Seda court held that the petitioner's post-redemption employ-
ment relationship with the corporation, which continued approxi-
mately two years, constituted a retained financial stake prohibited by
section 302(c)(2)(A).67 The court did not decide if section
302(c)(2)(A) prohibited all employment relationships per se.168 In-
stead, it relied on the Lewis financial or managerial interest test to
conclude that Seda had retained a prohibited interest.169
In a concurring opinion, Judge Whitaker disagreed with the major-
ity's application of the required finding of employment coupled with a
financial or managerial interest standard. He stated that the legisla-
tive history of section 302(c)(2)(A) indicated that retention as an of-
ficer, director, or employee interest was prohibited per se.170 Only
when the retained interest fell outside the parenthetical language,
however, was a facts and circumstances inquiry, similar to those in
Lennard and Chertkof, required.' 7 '
B. Lynch v. Commissioner
Seven months after Seda, the Tax Court confronted another pro-
hibited interest case in Lynch v. Commissioner.172 Lynch was the sole
shareholder of W.M. Lynch Company, which leased cast-in-place con-
crete pipe machines to building contractors. In December, 1975, peti-
tioner gave $16,000 to his son Gilbert, which the latter used, along with
$1,170 of his own money, to purchase fifty shares of stock from the
Lynch Company. 73 On the same day, both Lynch and his wife re-
signed as officers and directors. In December, 1975, the corporation
redeemed all of Lynch's 2,300 shares. Lynch received property and an
installment promissory note guaranteed by Gilbert, who pledged his
stock as security for the guarantee. If the corporation defaulted on the
note, Gilbert's stock, and with it full control of the corporation, was to
revert back to Lynch.174
Gilbert, who had begun to assume greater managerial responsibil-
166. Id. at 485-86.
167. Id- at 488.
168. The court, in stating that it did not decide if all retained employment relation-
ships were prohibited per se, cited the concurring opinion in Lewis. Id at 488 n.2.
169. 1d. at 488.
170. Id. at 491. Judge Whitaker did agree with Judge Simpson's concurring opinion in
Lewis that the retention of an officer's position in form only was not a prohibited
interest.
171. Id.
172. 83 T.C. 597 (1984).
173. The Commissioner did not assert any gift tax liability with respect to the transfer
of stock from the petitioner to Gilbert. Id at 612 n.5.
174. Id. at 599.
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ity for the corporation approximately two years before the redemp-
tion, retained his father's technical expertise on a consulting basis.
Lynch's knowledge of the technical aspects of cast-in-place concrete
pipe machines was extremely valuable since only two other concerns
in the Western United States owned machines similar to those leased
by the Lynch Company. Lynch entered into a written five-year con-
sulting agreement with the company. The agreement provided him a
monthly salary of $500 in addition to reimbursement of travel and en-
tertainment expenses. In return, Lynch agreed to provide technical
advisory services as reasonably requested by the company. Lynch also
signed a covenant not to compete against the company within the bor-
ders of California.175
In addition to the consulting agreement, Lynch retained certain
other corporate interests. First, he remained covered by the corpora-
tion's group medical insurance policy. When his coverage ended in
1980, Lynch had received a net benefit of $4,487.54 in premiums paid
by the corporation. Second, he was covered by a medical reimburse-
ment plan adopted by the corporation on the same day that Lynch and
his wife resigned as officers and directors. The plan limited its annual
medical reimbursement to $1,000 per plan member. The total plan re-
imbursements to Lynch totalled $96.05.176
Following the redemption, the corporation consulted Lynch on an
irregular basis. In 1976, however, Lynch did assist in planning the lay-
out of buildings and equipment at the corporation's plant. In 1976 and
1977, he advised the corporation on the renovation of thirteen pipe
machines. Immediately after the redemption, the petitioner made
daily trips to the office. These visits declined to only once or twice a
week approximately one year after the redemption. Although he ini-
tially shared an office with Gilbert, Lynch received a private office in
1979 when the corporation moved to new office quarters. The corpora-
tion also acquired a pickup truck for Lynch in 1977, which he used,
although not exclusively, for two years.1 77 In February, 1977, his
monthly payments pursuant to the contract were reduced to $250.
Subsequently, the contracting parties terminated their agreement one
year prior to its expiration. At no time did the corporation withhold
payroll taxes on its monthly payments to Lynch. 7 8 On the date of
redemption, Lynch did not subordinate his installment note to any
other creditor. In May, 1976, the company received a $350,000 bank
loan enabling them to purchase thirteen pipe machines. As a condi-
tion to the loan, Lynch had to subordinate his indebtedness to that of
175. Id. at 600. The agreement not to compete was for the duration of the consulting
contract. Id.
176. Id. at 601-02.
177. I& at 601.
178. Id.
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the bank's. The bank, in connection with its loan, took a security in-
terest in the corporation's assets which were then valued at
$985,000.179
The Tax Court held that Lynch did not retain a section
302(c)(2)(A) prohibited interest. Judge Simpson, writing for the
court, recited the retained "financial or managerial interest" standard
that he utilized in Lewiss 0 as the controlling standard in Lynch. He
modified the standard by agreeing with the concurring opinion in
Seda, which stated that when the interest retained is not one of an
employee, officer, or director, all of the facts and circumstances must
be examined to determine if a prohibited interest exists.18 '
The Commissioner argued that Lynch retained a financial interest
through his employment with the corporation after the redemption.
The Lynch court followed the Lennard court's common law control
test and held that Lynch was not under the corporation's control and
was, therefore, not an employee. The court emphasized Lynch's inde-
pendence in determining when he would work for the corporation as
well as his irregular attendance at the office. The court stated that his
advising the corporation on the purchase of the pipe machines was
within the scope of his status of an independent contractor. The court
acknowledged that Lynch's continued insurance and medical plan
benefits suggested an employee status, but concluded that the weight
of the evidence established his status as an independent contractor.18 2
Having found that Lynch provided services as an independent con-
tractor, the Tax Court examined all of the facts and circumstances to
determine the extent of his interest. Emphasizing that the consulting
payments were not geared to corporate profits and were in fact re-
duced in half approximately one year after the redemption, the court
held that he retained neither a financial nor managerial interest. Sim-
ilarly, the insurance and medical plan benefits, as well as the truck
furnished by the company, were in no way contingent on corporate
earnings. The court concluded that those benefits did not provide
Lynch a substantial interest in the corporate business.183
Stressing Gilbert's control over corporate policy decisions to diver-
sify, the Tax Court held that Lynch did not control the corporation
after the redemption. 8 4 In addition, the court stated that merely pro-
viding advice on corporate affairs is not prohibited. The Commis-
179. 1& at 602.
180. IcL at 605.
181. Id. In Seda, Judge Simpson sided with the majority and not Judge Whitaker's
concurring opinion. Seda v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 484, 489 (1984).
182. Lynch v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 597, 605-06 (1984).
183. Id at 606.
184. Prior to the redemption, the petitioner had considered diversifying the corpora-
tion. I& at 599.
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sioner argued that Lynch did not control the corporation but that he
had remained in a position to do so. The court responded that Lynch's
de facto control was not determinative; Gilbert, both nominally and
actually, controlled the corporation.1 8 5
The Commissioner argued next that Lynch's subordination of his
note to the bank's debt indicated a retained equity interest greater
than that of a creditor's. The Commissioner relied on the regulations
under section 302, which prohibit a redemption indebtedness from be-
ing in any sense proprietary and subordinated to the claims of general
creditors. The Tax Court, citing Lennard, held that subordination is
only one factor to be considered in determining the creditor interest.
The court stated that the regulations required the finding of both sub-
ordination and a proprietary interest, and thus held that its initial
finding of the petitioner's lack of a retained financial or managerial
interest in the corporation was also determinative in its finding of his
lack of a retained proprietary interest. The court also emphasized that
Lynch subordinated the note to a single creditor, the bank, and not
general creditors. Lynch, the court concluded, did not retain an inter-
est greater than that of a creditor.S6
Finally, the Commissioner asserted that the pledge agreement be-
tween Lynch and his son demonstrated that the redemption note was
similar to an equity interest prohibited by section 302(b)(3). The Com-
missioner relied on Regulation section 1.302-4(e), which prohibits a
distributee from acquiring an interest in the corporate stock. The Tax
Court noted that Lynch acquired a contingent right to acquire the
stock but did not acquire the stock itself, and held that such a right is
not inconsistent with the rights of a creditor.18 7
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE TAX COURT'S STANDARD
The Seda majority reaffirmed the Lewis standard of a retained "fi-
nancial or managerial interest." 8 8 The court held that Seda's two-
year term of employment with salary constituted a financial stake in
the corporation prohibited by section 302(c)(2)(A).189 The court did
185. Id at 607.
186. Id- at 609-10.
187. Id- at 610. The Commissioner raised two additional objections. First, he asserted
that the transfer of stock from Lynch to Gilbert was part of a scheme of which
the principal purpose was tax avoidance. That finding by the Tax Court would
prevent application of the § 302(c)(2)(A) family attribution waiver. The court
was convinced that the sole purpose of the transaction was to transfer corporate
control to Gilbert, and that no tax avoidance purpose was involved. Id at 611-12.
Secondly, the Commissioner argued that the redemption price was inflated. The
court dismissed that argument as a new theory not presented at trial and thus not
reviewable by the court. Id, at 612-13.
188. Seda v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 484, 488 (1984).
189. Id-
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not inquire further into the extent of Seda's employment relation-
ship.19 0 In fact, the court stated that the petitioners failed to show
that Seda no longer controlled the corporation.
Judge Whitaker's concurring opinion stated that section
302(c)(2)(A)(i) prohibits all employment relationships per se.191
While recognizing the congressional intent to bring clear standards to
the redemption area in arriving at this conclusion,192 the opinion falls
short of establishing fully the standards expressed by Congress. Judge
Whitaker's proposal, that the courts examine all of the surrounding
facts and circumstances when the interest challenged is one other
than that of an officer, director, or employee,193 conflicts directly with
the legislative history concerning the per se prohibition of employee
relationships. 94
Judge Whitaker stated that some of the section 302(b) and (c) rules
required factual inquiries' 95 while the remaining section 302 rules re-
quired application of mechanical tests.196 He supported his statement
with a reference to section 302(b)(1) redemptions (which require fac-
tual inquiries), and two law review articles stating that "Section 302(c)
was enacted as a 'safe haven. "197
Judge Whitaker's conclusion that section 302(c) presents a safe ha-
ven but remains subject to a facts and circumstances scrutiny is con-
fusing. He might have meant that the parenthetical language of
section 302(c)(2) (A) (i) provides a semi-safe haven or a shallow harbor
that taxpayers should attempt to avoid.198 If this is a correct interpre-
tation, the taxpayer is still confronted with uncertainty in planning a
redemption if his interest after the redemption is something other
than that of an employee, officer, or director. Both the articles and
190. The court was satisfied that two years of receiving a salary of $1,000 per month
constituted a prohibited interest. The opinion does not indicate the nature or
extent of Seda's duties.
191. Id. at 490. Judge Whitaker exempted relationships in form only from the per se
rule. Id at 491; see Lewis v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 129, 137 (1966) (Simpson, J.,
concurring).
192. Judge Whitaker relied on H.R. REP. No. 1337 which articulates the precise stan-
dards whereby a shareholder, under specific circumstances, will constructively
own the stock of his family. Seda v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 484, 490 (1984).
193. Id. at 491.
194. See supra notes 43-50, 191 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative his-
tory of § 302(c)(2)(A)).
195. Seda v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 484, 491 (1984).
196. Id.
197. Id, The articles cited by the court are Rose, supra note 34, at 145, and Kahn,
Stock Redemptions: The Standards for Qualifying a Purchase Under Section
302(b), 50 FORDHAM L. REV. (Part I) 1, 28 (1981-82).
198. In other words, a taxpayer structuring a redemption would know that an interest
retained as an officer, director, or employee is definitely prohibited by
§ 302(c)(2)(A). If the taxpayer desires an interest outside of the "safe harbor," he
subjects himself to an uncertain facts and circumstances test.
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legislative history relied on by Judge Whitaker reject this view.199
With the exception of section 302(b)(1), Congress intended to elimi-
nate the uncertainty of pre-1954 law by providing clear redemption
standards.2 00
The Lynch majority applied the two-step test set forth in the Seda
concurrence. First, the court determines if an employee relationship
exists. Second, if the individual is not an employee, the court inquires
into the extent of his financial or managerial interest, utilizing all of
the surrounding facts and circumstances. 20 ' Although Lynch recog-
nized the importance of a retained interest as an employee, the court
did not hold that an employee interest is prohibited per se.202 The
Lynch analysis focused on whether Lynch was an employee of the cor-
poration or an independent contractor.203 Similar to Lennard, Lynch
utilized the common law test of control. 204 The corporation's control
over the distributee has little to do with the congressional concern of a
distributee retaining control over the corporation.205 An independent
contractor may control a corporation just as easily as an employee.2 06
Concluding that Lynch was an independent contractor, the court
analyzed all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the extent of
his interest 20 7 and held that Lynch retained neither a financial nor a
managerial interest prohibited by section 302(c)(2)(A). 2 08 The court
emphasized the one-half reduction in monthly fees under the contract
and mitigated the importance of the medical, insurance, and truck
benefits. Thus, the Lewis "retained financial interest" standard re-
199. Both articles conclude that the distributee should not need to subject his interest
to a facts and circumstances test. Rose, supra note 34, at 166; Kahn, supra note
197, at 28-29. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text (discussing the con-
gressional intent to eliminate the factual inquiry test and bring certainty to the
family attribution rules).
200. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 30, at 41-42, reprinted in 2 REAMs, supra note 29, at
41-42.
201. Lynch v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 597, 604-05 (1984).
202. The Lynch court stated that the concurring opinion in Seda agreed with the need
for a factual inquiry if the distributee's interest fell outside the parenthetical lan-
guage. Id. at 605 n.2.
203. Id. at 604-05.
204. The Employment Tax Regulations state that the employer-employee relationship
exists when the person for whom the services are performed has the right to
direct and control the individual who performs the services. Employment Tax
Reg. 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2) (1985). Important factors that determine an
employee relationship include supplying tools and a place to work. Id. The Tax
Court did not address these factors in relation to Lynch's corporate-provided
truck and office.
205. Congress intended a distributee to completely sever his interests in the corpora-
tion, including but not limited to those of an employee, officer, or director. See
supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
206. Rose, supra note 34, at 150.
207. Lynch v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 597, 605-06 (1984).
208. Id.
[Vol. 65:486
PROHIBITED INTEREST
quired that the court measure the extent of Lynch's financial stake in
the corporation. Congress, however, sought to eliminate such a highly
subjective inquiry in the redemption area and provide instead for cer-
tainty and consistency.209 Thus, the variables constituting a prohib-
ited financial interest under the Tax Court's standard provide little
guidance for a taxpayer planning a redemption.2 10
The Tax Court held that Lynch's son completely controlled the
corporation. Yet immediately after the redemption, Lynch continued
to make daily appearances at the office.211 He also advised the corpo-
ration on the purchase of machinery and the layout scheme of a new
plant. His technical input and involvement in the corporate affairs,
therefore, fell short of a complete severance of corporate interests.
Although Lynch might have advised his son on corporate plans and
policies, the court held that merely providing advice to a corporation is
not prohibited. 212 Moreover, the court implied that Lynch would have
to exert control over his son to constitute a prohibited management
interest.21 3 The obvious difficulties in proving Lynch's control over
his son demonstrates the type of administrative burden associated
with the subjective inquiries that Congress attempted to alleviate
when it enacted the family stock attribution rules of section 302(c). 2 1 4
The rules provide a concise, mechanical test to determine when stock
attribution applies. The court's factual inquiry into the extent of
Lynch's actual control over the corporation conflicts with this con-
gressional intent.
The Tax Court also held that Mr. Lynch's subordination of his re-
demption note to a secured bank loan did not constitute an interest
greater than that of a creditor.2 15 Citing Lennard, the court held that
subordination by itself did not constitute a prohibited interest.1 6 Sub-
ordination of shareholder notes is an unavoidable hazard of family
corporations seeking large sums of credit, the prohibition of which
would render most family corporation redemptions impractical.217
Lynch's subordination of his note to a specific creditor and not to gen-
eral creditors is in accordance with the family shareholder's need to
209. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
210. The Tax Court dismissed without explanation the $4,487.54 in life insurance pre-
miums paid for the petitioner by the corporation. It also stressed the reduction in
monthly contract payments but did not consider that the contract, as originally
drafted, guaranteed the petitioner monthly payments for five years, regardless of
the actual services provided.
211. Section 302(c)(2)(A)(i) prohibits an interest retained immediately after the
distribution.
212. Lynch v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 597, 606 (1984).
213. Id at 607.
214. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
215. Lynch v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 597, 609 (1984).
216. Id.
217. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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subordinate debt. A proprietary interest under section 302(c)(2)(A),
however, is much more encompassing than an equity interest.218
Lynch's note subordination, therefore, coupled with his other proprie-
tary interests, such as his consulting contract and his medical and in-
surance benefits, constituted an interest greater than that of a
creditor.
VII. CONCLUSION
After Seda and Lynch, the Tax Court remains divided on whether
the post-redemption retention of an interest as an officer, employee,
or director constitutes a per se prohibited interest under section
302(c)(2)(A). Both decisions reflect a Tax Court policy to closely scru-
tinize any distributee who retains an interest listed in section
302(c)(2)(A)'s parenthetical language.
For retained interests not encompassed by the parenthetical lan-
guage, the Tax Court has failed to recognize the congressional intent
to bring certainty to the redemption area. The Tax Court's inquiry
into the facts and circumstances surrounding the extent of the distrib-
utee's retained financial or managerial interest is inconsistent with
the congressional intent surrounding section 302, an intent that share-
holders sever all ties with the corporation in order to receive capital
gains treatment. This complete severance of interests enables both
the Service and the taxpayer to determine objectively whether the
family attribution rules will apply to the proposed transaction.
Lynch also confuses the type of services that a distributee may pro-
vide the corporation. Previously, both the Service2 19 and the Tax
Court 2 0 maintained that a written contract for consulting services
constituted a prohibited interest. Lynch permits such a contract. In
addition, Lynch held that the factor which initially determines
whether the services provided constitute a prohibited interest is not
the extent of control that the distributee retains but the extent of con-
trol that the corporation exercises over the distributee.
Lynch creates confusion for taxpayers planning redemptions. A
taxpayer relying upon Lynch2 21 must closely scrutinize the facts sur-
rounding his expected retained interest. If the retained interest in-
cludes a position with the corporation as an officer, director, or
218. See supra notes 138-50 and accompanying text.
219. Rev. Rul. 70-104, 1970-1 C.B. 66 (1970).
220. Chertkof v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1113, afd, 649 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981).
221. Under the Ways and Means Committee's Proposed 1985 Tax Reform Bill (H.R.
3838), the current Internal Revenue Code's 60% capital gain deduction is reduced
to 50% for tax years beginning in 1986 and 42% for tax years beginning after 1986.
H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 241 (1985). Despite the reduced deduction for
capital gains, a taxpayer would continue to benefit from a redemption not treated
as "essentially equivalent to a dividend."
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employee, it likely will constitute a prohibited interest. The taxpayer
who avoids these interests must then revert to a factual analysis to
measure the extent of the retained financial or managerial interest.
This procedure, however, runs afoul of Congress' explicit intent to
bring certainty to the redemption area. Instead, taxpayers seeking a
true safe-harbor should follow the Service's view and sever all post-
redemption interests with the corporation.
